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Kyle Moran
Honor’s Project Report
Final Draft
Brexit: The Best Bad Option
Election results around the world in 2016 and 2017 delivered what seemed like blow after
blow to the post-War order. The United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, something
thought to be an absurd prospect just a few years prior. Donald Trump won the nomination in the
Republican Party in the United States and went on to win the Presidency—both of which were
repeatedly said to be impossible. Far-right parties in Europe made enormous gains: Marine Le
Pen’s far-right National Front party placed second in the first round of their presidential
election.1 This set the stage for a woman credibly accused of fascist inclinations to face off
against Emmanuel Macron, a man who had only founded his political party a year prior.2
There are many more examples, but they all sent a message of grave concern to many about the
future stability of politics. Headlines like “democracy in crisis” or “democracy in retreat”
became common to read in outlets left, right, and center.
This paper asserts that there was no entirely positive outcome possible for the United
Kingdom’s relationship with Europe. Having been somewhat of an outlier since it joined the
community in 1972, the collapse of the Soviet Union and more recent divergence between the
United States and the EU, Britain was increasingly isolated at Brussels. Continued membership
of the EU would have both hindered closer European economic, political, and military
integration while simultaneously alienating London. Furthermore, Europe has seen the rise of
authoritarian-populist parties over the last two decades. This paper also argues that the United
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Kingdom’s decision to hold an in/out referendum on continued EU membership—as well as the
Conservative Party’s decision to co-opt some policies from the insurgent United Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP) and Brexit Party—has allowed the country to overcome illiberal
populism comparatively better than its continental partners. While the recent COVID-19
outbreak creates a great deal of uncertainty, the United Kingdom appears well-positioned to
maintain its status as a liberal democracy.

Divergence Between the US and EU, and its Impact on the UK
The basis of the post-War order has rested on cooperation and a close alliance between the
United States, the United Kingdom, and western continental Europe. With the threat of Nazi
Germany gone, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union plummeted, leading the
continent into the Cold War. Throughout it all, two different schools of international relations
scholars—realists and liberal institutionalists—agreed that cooperation between these powers
was vital, and in all of the states’ interest.3 It is only after the fall of the Soviet Union that these
two schools began to diverge: liberal institutionalists broadly believed that liberalism had ‘won
the day,’ so to speak, while realists were increasingly concerned about the lack of balance of
power in the continent.4 Specifically, the absence of the threat of war would undermine the
institutions that had been built over the last half-century, according to realists. Without arguing
that institutions cannot work, realists such as international relations scholar John Mearsheimer
argue that
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States sometimes operate through institutions. However, they believe that those rules
reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution
of power… For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the
balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the
system. NATO is an institution, and it certainly played a role in preventing World War
III and helping the West win the Cold War. Nevertheless, NATO was basically a
manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it
was that balance of power, not NATO per se, that provided the key to maintaining
stability on the continent.5
If the realist vision was to come to fruition, then it would take the form of a divergence in
foreign policy between the United States and continental Europe, with the United Kingdom
likely maintaining closer proximity to Washington than Brussels as far as policy is concerned.
Britain has long seen preserving its close relationship with the US as being in its critical interest,
far above and beyond that of its European allies. Even during the Cold War, this was apparent in
the policy and rhetoric of British leaders: the United Kingdom was consistently an outlier in
terms of matching the hawkish approach personified by American presidents. For instance,
during a summit aimed at reducing the number of armaments on both sides, a common split
between the American and the European approach quickly bubbled to the surface, with then
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher taking Washington’s side:
Of course, all of us wanted both strong defence and successful negotiations with the
Soviet Union to reduce the level of armaments. But there was a real question about
should come first… Some countries hoped to be able to delay virtually indefinitely the
implementation of the decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles. For example,
in the dying days of the Schmidt Government there were strong voices in Germany
arguing that deployment would jeopardize the prospect of successful negotiations. By
contrast, the Americans and we in Britain felt that a strong defence posture is an
absolute prerequisite for any constrictive relationship with the USSR and therefore
deterrence is the condition for détente.6
If differences during the Cold War can be described as a “rift,” relations since the fall of
the Soviet Union have deteriorated into a chasm. This is particularly true since the election of
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President Donald Trump, but was present before as well. In the leadup to the American-led Iraq
War, for instance, some of the strongest opposition the coalition faced was from European
powers. France proved particularly obstinate, frequently siding with Russia in vetoing United
Nations Security Council resolutions condemning Saddam Hussein’s government in Baghdad.
Then Prime Minister Tony Blair summarized the situation concisely.
There were nations for whom the American alliance was a fundamental part of their
foreign policy. They tended to back the U.S. Allies of the U.S. outside Europe, such as
Japan and South Korea, also rallied… Australia gave unflinching and determined
support under John Howard. Then there were those for whom the alliance was
important, but not fundamental. They backed off. As happens in these situations, the
dynamic of disagreement then started to fashion new alliances, with France, Germany,
and Russia, in particular, moving to create an alternative pole of power and influence.
[emphasis added]7
The United Kingdom, for its part, was one of the strongest proponents of the coalition invasion
of Iraq. Tony Blair, a Labour Prime Minister, has been largely credited with leading the push at
the United Nations at getting international approval—and negotiating with France.8
Since the election of Donald Trump in 2016, this divergence between continental Europe
and the United States has grown rapidly. Elected on an isolationist platform, he has gone on the
record as saying that NATO—the military alliance between American and European powers—is
“obsolete,” although he has since declared that this is no longer the case.9 French President
Emmanuel Macron has described the alliance as “brain-dead” in an interview that he stands by.10
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Regardless of who is to blame, international relations scholars broadly agree that NATO is in
crisis.11
In response to this divergence, many European leaders have recognised that being largely
dependent on the United States for military defences is no longer in their interest, thus prompting
calls for the creation of an “EU army.” Then President of the European Commission Jean-Claude
Junker was the first to do so in 2016.12 French President Emmanuel Macron backed this idea in
November 2018, and was quickly followed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel.13
The United Kingdom, meanwhile, has long maintained that it is opposed to “any idea of
any form of an EU army.”14 Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote about this as far
back as 2002:
France has for many years wanted to see an alternative military power to an Americanled NATO. The European Union’s plans for a separate integrated European defence
have provided the French with a unique opportunity to achieve this goal. The French
and those who think like them have been so insistent on achieving an autonomous
European defence capability precisely because they see it as constituting a vital
attribute of a new European superpower which will rival the United States.15
Whether or not such an army will be created remains to be seen, but it is another division
between continental European states and the United Kingdom. While London is not the only
state opposed to the creation of such an entity, this would have necessitated yet another British
‘opt-out’. In a union striving for ever-closer integration, continued British membership would
have meant a consistent thorn in its side opposing such measures.
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The Referendum
There has been a great deal of analysis looking at former Prime Minister David
Cameron’s decision to call for an in/out referendum on continued membership in the European
Union.16 If he had not, Britain would still be a member of the EU. Some analysis laments this
decision that led to the British departure.17
Other analyses paint different pictures. While some rhetoric about politicians being “out
of touch” with the electorate on this issue is overblown, it nevertheless appears to have some
legitimacy on the question of Brexit: 73 per cent of Members of Parliament endorsed remain,
including 56 per cent of Conservative MPs, despite only 48 per cent of the country voted that
way.18 Nevertheless, there were still a sizable number of MPs who endorsed Leave, indicating
that the number who were “out of touch” was significant without being overwhelming.
While the referendum delivered a shock to the British political system, the fact that a
majority of Britons cast their vote for Remain indicates that a sizeable number of them would
have been willing to vote for politicians who had made opposition to the EU central to their
platform. In this light, pre-referendum Britain looks quite similar to continental Europe: a
growing right-wing to far-right party that was demanding change, with many mainstream
politicians uncertain of how to proceed.19 In 2014, the Eurosceptic United Kingdom
Independence Party placed first in the European elections, receiving 27.5 per cent of the vote.20
The far-right British National Party also saw gains in previous years, although it maintained
“minor party” status with no elected MPs or MEPs.21
16
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The referendum indicates that in 2016, the absolute “ceiling” for a Eurosceptic party
would be just better than half of the electorate. Considering that many who voted Leave were
Conservatives—and smaller but significant portion of the electorate Labour—a party like UKIP
seems unlikely to have ever come close to a majority of the vote. However, a majority of the vote
is not required for a majority in Parliament: candidates with the plurality in constituencies take
the seat for MP, which usually ensures a government with a majority of seats but only a plurality
of the popular vote.
Nevertheless, an outright majority for UKIP remains almost certain to have been
impossible to achieve. What is much more likely, though, would be Conservative-UKIP pact in
order to address the concerns of a growing part of the electorate. Prime Minister David Cameron
was concerned about their rise, and admitted that he himself saw the “attraction” of the party to
Tory voters.22
This would have been an enormous boost to the legitimacy of Nigel Farage’s party,
which was still seen as too new and too single-issue focused to be taken credibly. Nevertheless,
if it could begin to make inroads with the electorate in general elections as it did in European
elections, a hung parliament necessitating a Conservative-UKIP coalition would not be beyond
the pale. An in/out referendum would likely have been the party’s requirement for entering into
coalition.
Certainly, the Tories would have other options. They could re-enter into coalition with
the Liberal Democrats, although this is unlikely for both parties. The Liberal Democrats
generally regard the coalition as a mistake, as the junior partner tends to come out of government
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looking rather defeated.23 The Tories, increasingly threatened by UKIP and consisting
themselves of many Eurosceptics, would be unlikely to enter into coalition with an
enthusiastically pro-EU party.

The Worst Possible Idea: A Second Referendum
Beginning in 2017 and lasting through the 2019 general election, there was a significant
chance that a second in/out referendum would be held.24 Many of the criticisms that the so-called
“People’s Vote” movement made regarding the first referendum were legitimate: it was unclear
what “Leave” meant.25 It did not specify whether that had to be with an exit deal, or what that
exit deal would look like. Depending on whether there would be a deal or the shape that the deal
would take undoubtedly would have altered many voting behaviours. Because of parliamentary
numbers, though, this referendum never took place.26 Nevertheless, given the seriousness with
which this option was presented, it is worth analysing what the impact of it would have had.
To begin with, the wording of the proposed second referendum was never agreed to by
any political party, which could have proven to be a potentially fatal downfall.27 There were
several options for how to word the question, but all of them had serious flaws.
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First, there was the potential to essentially do a referendum on the withdrawal agreement
negotiated by Theresa May, and later by Boris Johnson. For Remainers, this likely would have
proven well and good – they would go in and vote “no”. However, it’s more complicated than
that. Brexiteers would face the option of voting for a deal that many found to be unpopular, with
a very real prospect of many either not voting or voting “no” themselves.28 If Brexiteers and
Remainers both voted “no” because the withdrawal agreement maintained too close of a
relationship with the EU, how valid would a decision to scrap Brexit entirely off of it be?
A second option was to have three options: leave with a deal of some kind, leave with no
deal, or to remain. This fell into the same trap of not knowing what a deal would look like, but
was more problematic: if 30 per cent of the country voted to leave with a deal, 30 per cent voted
to leave without a deal, and 40 per cent voted to remain, then Remain would have won despite 60
per cent of the country voting Leave.
If the issues with the wording are put aside for a moment, we arrive at an even larger
problem for the future of democracy in the United Kingdom. One of the chief complaints about
the European Union is its so-called “democratic deficit,” or top-down nature with minimal input
from voters. While it has taken serious steps in recent years to reform, this remained a top
concern for those who voted for Brexit – they felt as though “Brussels” was too powerful, and
they themselves not able to change the direction of the EU.
For those British citizens who came out to vote Leave in 2016, the prospect of Brexit
being “cancelled” after the fact would have done irreconcilable damage to their faith in political
system to deliver. This would only be compounded by the fact that both of the major political
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parties pledging to deliver on the outcome of the referendum.29 In terms of undermining
democracy, there are few conceivable options that would have had a more devastating blow to
those who would have voted Leave twice.
This is not a one-sided issue, though. In fact, the damage of a second referendum could
be worse for those who vote Remain twice. While they would have successfully stopped Brexit,
it would be fundamentally different in nature than if the majority had voted Remain the first time
around. They would have already lost, and would have seen both major parties—parties that
many were members of—essentially abandon them for some period of time. While Labour came
around to a second referendum, it only did so in 2019 and after Theresa May’s withdrawal
agreement proved too unpopular to pass Parliament.30
If a majority in Britain can vote to Leave once, it can do so twice. The threat of Brexit
would be far from over, and there would be a newly alienated bloc of voters who (not
illegitimately) felt lied to. A second referendum that ended with Remain would not have solved
Brexit, it would have further damaged democracy and extended the issue for years to come.
Some analysis has looked with borderline bewilderment on the growing number of voters
who are willing to cast their vote for increasingly extreme politicians and political parties.31 One
work, however, stands out for the clarity that it brings to the issue – or, at least for many cases of
recent insurgent populist movements. Ivan Krastev’s After Europe shines light on just this issue,
saying:
The European Union [serves] as kind of a safety net, which mitigates against risktaking (keeping countries from advancing irresponsible policies) but incentivizes voters
29
Rowena Mason, “Labour Would End Free Movement but Not ‘Sever Ties’ with EU, Starmer Says,” The
Guardian, 25 April 2017.
30
Max Colchester, “May’s Deal is Rejected for a Third Time by Lawmakers,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 March
2019.
31
Ian Dunt, Brexit: What the Hell Happens Now? (Kingston: Canbury Press, 2018); Jan Zielonka, CounterRevolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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to support irresponsible political parties and leaders as a way of signalling
disappointment and anger. Why should Poles fear someone like Kaczynski if they know
that Brussels will tame him if he goes too far?32
Here, Krastev puts forward a tool of analysis that helps to make significantly more sense of
recent European affairs. When populists are met with the full-fronted barrage of institutional
opposition, voters don’t see the impact that the irresponsible policies that the populists want to
enact. Or at least, in many cases, they won’t until it’s too late. When a German citizen who wants
to vote to decrease the number of migrants arriving in his country, the only party that seeks to
deliver on his intentions is the AfD. Mainstream parties offer only lukewarm alternatives for a
voter with this concern.
If we apply Krastev’s argument to post-Referendum Britain, policies that would
previously have looked very attractive to many start to look less and less appealing. For many
Britons, a second referendum – or, as the Liberal Democrats proposed, cancelling Brexit entirely
– would have had an even more profoundly negative impact on democracy than previously
argued.33

British versus Continental European Politics
Comparing the rise of populists throughout Europe and the United States can be useful,
but differences must be recognised when doing so. This paper asserts that the political landscape
in the United Kingdom is sufficiently different from the rest of continental Europe – and has
been since before joining in 1973 – that comparisons between the Brexit movement and
continental anti-EU movements can only be useful in identifying limited grievances, while
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becoming a hinderance as a tool of analysis while looking at the goals and desired policy
outcomes.
In terms of commonality with continental anti-EU movements, anti-immigrant sentiment
is perhaps the single greatest overlap.34 Nigel Farage, for instance, championed a poster
depicting large numbers of Middle Eastern migrants crossing into Greece despite the United
Kingdom not sharing open borders with continental European states.35 In terms of rhetoric on
immigration, some of the leading Brexiteers have a significant amount in common with their
continental Eurosceptics.
Even on this issue, though, the policy angle and professed aspirations of leading
Brexiteers marks the United Kingdom as distinctly different than the rest of the continent.
Rhetoric and public sentiment surrounding the politics of immigration in continental Europe is
significantly more xenophobic and racist, with right-wing parties placing a particularly strong
emphasis on preserving their state’s white majority.36 Studies have demonstrated the United
Kingdom’s approach towards immigration is significantly less focused on race, both in terms of
public sentiment and rhetoric from politicians. Since the Brexit vote, public concern has more
than havled, dropping precipitously from 44 per cent to 17 per cent. This is the second-lowest
result according to Pew research, with only Spain being less concerned—although it should be
noted that the peak of opposition to immigration was 9 per cent in 2015.37 Britain’s recently
unveiled immigration overhaul delivers on this aspiration: it is expected that India, Australia,
South Korea, China, and New Zealand will receive the largest boost in terms of number of
34
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immigrants entering the country, with Eastern Europe being among the hardest hit.38 India stands
out above the other previously mentioned states, with student visas up a staggering 93 per cent
last year.39
This situation would be essentially unthinkable under the guise of a continental
nationalist leader such as Le Pen. During her 2017 presidential campaign, she repeatedly asserted
that upon taking office she would immediately close the borders in France and deliver on a netzero immigration rate.40 All this, she says, to “protect France for the French.” While it is unlikely
that such a policy could be upheld for any significant period of time, it nevertheless offers a
profoundly different outlook on immigration than found in London. The far-right Dutch Party for
Freedom has made banning the Qur’an and closing all Mosques part of its policy platform.41
There have been other reforms that further demonstrate the difference between the British
government from other continental nationalist movements. For instance, within his first 60 days
as Prime Minister, Boris Johnson slashed previous restrictions on non-EU students who want to
study in the United Kingdom and remain after graduating.42 This policy change offers any
international student graduating in the UK without employment the ability to stay for up to two
years while looking for a job. This reform also slashed the previous cap on the number of UK
student visas granted, with no limit currently set.
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Boris Johnson’s ascendency to the head of the Conservative Party can be seen as a move
away from a more market-oriented approach championed by Thatcherites. While less ultraliberal than his predecessors, the issue of free trade also distinguishes the Brexit movement from
other populist insurgencies. Donald Trump lamented the impact of free trade in his inaugural
address as “American carnage.”43 Marine Le Pen described international companies doing
business inside France as “international predators.”44
If Johnson’s administration has become radical on any issue, it is this. Throwing off the
advice of its allies including the United States, it refused to prohibit Huawei from building the
nation’s 5G network infrastructure under the guise of rejecting “mercantilism.”45 There is no
political leader in Europe who speaks as defensively about free trade as Johnson:
My friends, I am here to warn you today that this beneficial magic is fading. Free trade
is being choked. The mercantilists are everywhere. The protections are gaining ground.
From Brussels to China to Washington, tariffs are being waved around like cudgels
even on debates on foreign policy, where frankly they have no place. And, there is an
ever-growing proliferation of non-tariff barriers.
The resulting tensions are letting the air out of the tires of the world economy…
humanity needs some government, somewhere, who is willing to make the case,
powerfully, for freedom of exchange…
Here in Greenwich in the first week of February 2020, I can tell you in all humility that
the United Kingdom is ready for that role.46
With Freedom House marking democracy as “in retreat” in 2017, downgrading multiple
countries from the United States to Hungary, the United Kingdom remains at the front of the
pack with a 94 per cent freedom rating. The six points keeping it from a perfect score relate to
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Britain’s long-standing laws surrounding slander in the press, which it is concerned can stifle
legitimate inquiry and investigation. Many European states also boast similar numbers—what
makes the United Kingdom different, however, is that is has by and large “put to rest” its illiberal
far-right. Factoring in the impact that the COVID-19 crisis has had so far, this remains the case:
recent polling demonstrates that the Brexit Party does not have the support to win a single seat in
the House of Commons, while the Tories are polling at 50 per cent.47

If Liberals Won’t Enforce Borders, Fascists Will
Credit must be given to David Frum for the title of this section. His 2019 article in the
Atlantic with the aforementioned title concisely argued for a move away from the post-war
liberal consensus that immigration in any numbers was necessarily a net good for society.48 The
decision by many liberal parties, he argued—with the support of a considerable amount of
evidence—to oppose immigration restrictionism has had a disastrous impact on elections
throughout Europe. In particular, he argues, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision in
2015 to effectively open Germany’s borders to migrants seeking to relocate there had profound
implications for the rest of the EU.
To begin with Merkel, the decision she took – moral or immoral, right or wrong –
directly applied exclusively to Germany, but in effect applied to the vast majority of EU member
states (all of whom are part of the Schengen open-border agreement). While Germany was
indeed the top destination for migrants entering Europe, there were still externalities: migrants
granted amnesty in Germany were then free to enter any other EU state.
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The open-border policy amongst Schengen countries is one that took considerable time
and negotiation to implement. As each state lowered its borders to one another, focus shifted
from the national level to the supranational. France’s border with Spain was no longer the issue,
as France was now focused on migrants entering southern Italy. This issue was the rationale for
the negotiation of the 1997 Dublin Protocols, to which every EU member country signed on in
agreement.
Merkel’s 2015 decision to—in the words of the German Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees—“largely no longer enforce Dublin procedures for Syrian citizens”—was technically
legal under the Dublin Protocols, but left other European states feeling powerless.49 After having
lowered internal borders on the premise of mutual consent between cooperating member states,
Germany had decided – unilaterally, and without a single vote in the Bundestag – that it was
suspending this agreed upon way of processing migrant applications.
As Frum argues, the fact that the leading political opponents – and, in many cases, the
only political opponents – of such policies came from some of the most authoritarian populist
figures did great harm to electoral stability in Europe. In particular, a photograph of a Syrian
child who had drowned at sea and whose body subsequently washed up on a beach – Alan Kurdi
– changed the debate surrounding immigration in a way that few would have imagined
possible.50 Seemingly overnight, politicians who had tended to be sceptical or downright
opposed to immigration flipped their positions. Prime Minister David Cameron, who had
campaigned on a platform of opposing EU-enforced migrant quotas and protecting Britain’s
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immigration opt-outs, announced a U-turn in policy: he would allow a further 20,000 Syrian
migrants into the country.51
This happened at precisely the wrong moment, at least electorally speaking: antiimmigration sentiment had been on the uptick, with the right-wing United Kingdom
Independence Party gaining traction at an alarming rate and the far-right British Nationalist Party
(BNP) still a threat. Anti-immigration sentiment had never been absent in the United Kingdom,
with polls showing a majority of Britons believing that rates off immigration were too high for
decades.52 What changed by 2010 and on was not simply the number of Britons who believed
this; rather, in the words of journalist Jason Farrell, it was “the feeling that the government was
powerless to control it.”53
The benefit of hindsight allows us to place blame for this squarely at Cameron’s feet. In
particular, his government’s stated goal of reducing immigration to the tens of thousands per
year had an especially negative impact on Britons’ perception of migration. It was an artificially
created target with no basis in economic necessity. Furthermore, it was by and large an
unachievable goal.54 By setting a target that he could not have possibly met, his government was
faced with headlines year after year over failing to reach their quota. In so doing, this policy
linked migration numbers that exceeded the target per year as being a “bad thing.”
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The ability of established parties to move one way or another to out-flank an insurgent
party, referred to in academic literature as the “parrot hypothesis” has been well documented.55
This also fits with Ivan Krastev’s previously mentioned hypothesis. In moving towards a more
humanitarian approach on immigration, the Conservative Party ceded ground to authoritarianpopulist parties. In doing so, any voter with anti-migration inclination could either vote against
what they believe to be their interests or vote for a party that most would have considered to be
rather unpalatable. By declaring that there was no alternative to immigration, the Conservative
Party gave UKIP—and subsequently, the Brexit Party—rather uncontested reign to run as the
most anti-migration party.
This theory fits with the collapse of both UKIP after the 2016 referendum, as well as the
subsequent Brexit party in the 2019 general election. In the first case, many voters believed that
Theresa May had moved rightwards on migration from Cameron. In the second case, voters
believed that Boris Johnson had changed the government’s approach to the question of passing
the withdrawal deal to vote Conservative, after having abandoned the party for Nigel Farage’s
Brexit party in the same year’s European elections, in part through harsher rhetoric and in part by
insisting that he would rather have the UK leave the EU without a deal than to request another
extension. While an extension was requested, it was done so without the Prime Minister’s name
or signature on it after a parliamentary vote mandated it be sent. Johnson followed the request
with a letter he did sign requesting that the extension not be granted.56
The critical difference here is that while the Brexit party, UKIP, and other far-right
parties have some to extreme authoritarian views on many issues, the Conservative Party largely
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does not. Pippa Norris, a scholar of authoritarian populism, highlights this difference in her 2019
work:
The anti-immigrant backlash provides opportunities for Authoritarian-Populist parties
to harvest votes by advocating hard-line nationalist policies. They can exploit this issue,
particularly where mainstream politicians share a liberal consensus that deters them
from following suit. But if mainstream parties react by adopting immigration policies
that are more restrictive and nationalistic language, stealing their rival’s clothes while
simultaneously ostracizing Authoritarian-Populist parties, the latter may find
themselves squeezed out.57
While the 2019 general election was held after the publication of the book, this theory does hold
quite well in analysing the 2017 general election. She writes that this helps explain
The outcome of the June 2017 UK general elections, where UKIP support faded
following Theresa May’s Conservative Party pledge to implement tighter migration
restrictions on EU citizens.58
The Conservative Party’s decision to co-opt UKIP and the Brexit Party on certain issues
has been largely limited immigration, while not yielding ground on policies that would erode
freedoms ensured by liberal democracies. For instance, both insurgent British parties have taken
a particularly harsh approach towards Islam. The overtly authoritarian direction that UKIP was
trending prompted its founder, Nigel Farage, to quit the party in 2018 on the grounds of
“extremism.”59 While many liberal democracies do have relatively open immigration policies,
this is not a requirement under Freedom House’s assessment: Singapore, which has one of the
most liberal immigration policies in the world with forty per cent of its population being
migrants, has a failing score from the group on account of its authoritarian government.60 Japan,
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meanwhile, enjoys a near-perfect score despite extreme restrictions on migration. These laws
have recently been relaxed, but remain quite restrictive.61

Has Britain Transcended Populism?
For the United States and much of continental Europe, the impact that resurgent populism
and nationalism will have remains unclear, but undoubtedly remains a threat. Donald Trump
could win re-election in 2020.62 The National Rally (formerly National Front) placed first in
France’s European Elections and have not seen a decline in support since. Hungary has recently
granted its leader, Viktor Orban, “unlimited, indefinite” powers due to the emergence of
coronavirus.63 In Germany the AfD has been less successful at making inroads but has still seen
a surge in support. With long-time Chancellor Angela Merkel set to leave office, the future here
is unclear as well.64 There has been a rise in support for Merkel’s Christian Democrats in 2020 as
they are seen as taking broadly more restrictionist policies on immigration, but the AfD had
continued to make inroads into 2019.65
Looking at the United Kingdom, Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party represented a populist surge
as an entirely new party. Putting aside a significant difference in ideology and desired policy
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outcomes, a comparison between the two parties puts on clear display a dramatic divergence in
politics between the two countries.
In December’s general election, the Conservative Party – the world’s oldest political
party still in existence – picked up a significant parliamentary majority. The size of the majority
caught many off-guard – polling up until the day of the election indicated at most a small
majority for the Tories, with a genuine chance of a hung parliament.66 Faced with the potential of
losing, many called for a formal alliance between the Tories and the Brexit Party – where the
former would stand down its candidates in constituencies believed to be unwinnable, and the
latter standing down in the overwhelming majority of constituencies. While Brexit MP
candidates did indeed stand down in constituencies at the time held by Conservative MPs, they
stood down 317 candidates throughout the country.67
The Conservatives, however, stood down zero candidates. The risk of ceding ground to a
new insurgent party was too great, Tory strategists believed. The result was decisive: not a single
Brexit Party candidate won constituencies. On national television, Nigel Farage – the man
leading a party that placed first just a few months before in the European elections – had his face
plastered on banners depicting his party with the number “zero” indicating how seats he had
taken. After British MEPs departed the European Parliament for the final time, the Brexit Party
officially had no further representation in the House of Commons, the House of Lords, or in
Europe. Given the size of the Conservative’s majority, they will be out of power for at least five
years.68
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Conclusion
The past two decades have been turbulent for Europe, and the outcome of Britain’s
2016 referendum has contributed to that sense of disturbance. However, this paper has
argued that because of historic differences between London and continental Europe,
continued British membership in the EU would have left it further isolated as the
community seeks to integrate its defences in response to a divergence with American
policies. Additionally, this paper has argued that in the face of rising illiberal populist
parties, the Conservative Party has performed comparatively better than its continental
partners. While concerns about democracy being in retreat and the gains that far-right
parties have made persist in some European states, the United Kingdom appears to be well
positioned to maintain its status as a healthy liberal democracy.
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